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Highlights
• An MILP-based fair profit distribution framework is developed for multi-echelon supply
chains.
• Transfer pricing, production, distribution and capacity planning of the supply chains are
considered as the key decisions.
• Solution approaches are developed using Nash bargaining and lexicographic maximin princi-
ples under proportional and max-min fairness criteria.
• A tailored hierarchical approach developed for approximate max-min fair solutions demon-
strates computational advantage.
• Results from two examples demonstrate the applicability of the proposed models and ap-
proaches.
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Abstract
The total profit maximisation of a supply chain network may result in an uneven and impractical
profit distribution among the members. This work addresses the fair profit distribution within
a multi-echelon supply chain using transfer prices. A mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
model framework is proposed for the optimal production, distribution and capacity planning of a
supply chain network of an active ingredient (AI), consisting of AI plants, formulation plants and
markets. The transfer prices of the AI from AI plants to formulation plants, and those of products
from formulation plants to markets are to be optimised. The proportional and max-min fairness
criteria are adopted to define fair profit distributions. Considering bargaining powers of supply
chain members, game theoretic solution approaches are developed for fair solutions using Nash
bargaining and lexicographic maximin principles. Especially, a hierarchical approach is developed
to obtain an approximate optimal fair solution efficiently. The applicability and efficiency of the
proposed approaches are demonstrated by two examples, including a real world agrochemical supply
chain network.
Keywords: Supply chains, fair profit distribution, transfer price, mixed integer linear
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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, supply chains have been reshaped into complex networks involving
suppliers, production sites, distribution facilities and markets. The optimisation of supply chains
in the process industry has received extensive attention in the literature (Grossmann, 2005; Shah,
2005; Papageorgiou, 2009; Barbosa-Po´voa, 2012). Many supply chain optimisation models and5
approaches just consider one supply chain as a whole (Tsiakis & Papageorgiou, 2008; Sousa et al.,
2011; Longinidis & Georgiadis, 2011; Liu et al., 2012; Cardoso et al., 2013; Mun˜oz et al., 2015;
Gaur et al., 2017). However, in real practice, there are conflicting interests of individual supply
chain members that all aim to pursue the most profit and benefit for themselves, which need to
be taken into account for optimisation. When the total profit of a supply chain is maximised to10
enhance its performance, the profit of the whole supply chain is usually distributed to its members
in an uneven way, which could lead to negative impacts, including dissatisfaction of members,
instability of systems and coalition, disadvantage in competitive edge, loss of markets, increasing
costs and reduction in revenue. Thus, a fairer profit distribution is preferred to maintain stability
and competitiveness of supply chain networks.15
The fairness issues have been widely investigated in some fields, e.g. welfare economics (Varian,
1975; Fleurbaey, 2008), telecommunications (Jain et al., 1984; Mazumdar et al., 1991), and supply
chain contracting (Cui et al., 2007; Katok & Pavlov, 2013; Ho et al., 2014). The concept, perception
and interpretation of fairness vary depending on problems and people involved, and there is no single
fairness criterion applicable to all problems. In the literature, there are two widely accepted fairness20
criteria: proportional fairness and max-min fairness (Bertsimas et al., 2011), which satisfy a set of
generally agreed axioms for ideal fairness criterion. This paper aims to develop an optimisation
framework for fair profit distribution among supply chain members using transfer prices under these
two fairness criteria.
Transfer price is generally referred to as the intra-company price that a selling department, di-25
vision or subsidiary of a company charges for a product or service supplied to a buying department,
division, or subsidiary of the same company (Abdallah, 1989; Pfeiffer, 1999). However, recently the
terminology has been extended to inter-company payments in decentralised supply chain networks
3
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(Gjerdrum et al., 2002; Lakhal, 2006). In this work, the considered multi-echelon supply chain
members are regarded as independent profit centres that can determine their transfer prices. The30
transfer pricing has been used as an income-shifting mechanism to the subsidiaries in lower tax
countries so as to increase their after-tax profits (O’Connor, 1997; Vidal & Goetschalckx, 2001;
Shunko & Gavirneni, 2007; Miller & de Matta, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2013). In the meantime, it
is also important to determine profit-based incentives for members or divisions involved in a sup-
ply chain network (Lakhal, 2006; Shunko et al., 2014; Hammami & Frein, 2014; Liu et al., 2015).35
Although, in the international trading, transfer pricing is controversial and under restriction and
scrutiny from many regulations, rules and guidelines of fiscal agencies and governments to avoid
the manipulation of transfer prices (Mehafdi, 2000), companies usually still have the flexibility to
determine the transfer price level from some range of values within given limits (Vidal & Goetschal-
ckx, 2001). There is a range of acceptable transfer prices, instead of only a single transfer price,40
allowed by the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
United States (Markham, 2005).
Research studies and papers are emerging on the use of transfer price to distribute profit fairly
in supply chains. Mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) models were developed by Gjer-
drum et al. (2001, 2002), where Nash bargaining approach was used for fair profit distribution in45
a multi-enterprise supply chain. Chen et al. (2003) developed a fuzzy-based decision model for
multiobjective optimisation of the production and distribution planning of a multi-echelon supply
chain network, considering profit maximisation, customer service level minimisation, and ensuring
fair profit distribution. Then, Chen & Lee (2004) extended the above work for the uncertainties of
both demand and price. A cooperative game constructed by Rosenthal (2008) fairly allocated the50
net profit using transfer prices, considering both perfect information and asymmetric information
environment. Leng & Parlar (2012) developed a cooperative game to determine optimal transfer
prices for fair profit allocation within a two-echelon supply chain with one upstream division and
multiple downstream ones. Yue & You (2014) developed an MINLP model for profit allocation
strategy using material transfer prices and revenue share policies of cellulosic bioethanol supply55
chains. Recently, Liu et al. (2016) proposed a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model
4
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for optimal fair transfer prices of a two-echelon supply chain. However, this work did not clearly
justify the criterion of fair solutions and consider the different negotiation abilities of the supply
chain members.
In this work, we aim to develop an optimisation-based fair profit distribution framework for inte-60
grated production, distribution and capacity planning of multi-echelon supply chains, by extending
the work of Liu et al. (2016). In order to reflect real practice, different bargaining powers of supply
chain members are considered. Here, we use two well accepted fairness criteria, proportional and
max-min fairness, to define fair profit distribution. It is beyond the scope of this work to investigate
the negotiation process of fairness criterion, and examine whether a fairness criterion is accepted by65
all members of the supply chain. To find fair solutions under these two fairness criteria, two game
theoretic principles, Nash bargaining and lexicographic maximin principles, are adopted to develop
solutions approaches for fair profit distribution. To overcome the computational difficulties of large
problem instances, a tailored efficient solution approach based on the classic lexicographic maximin
approach is developed for max-min fair profit distribution. Overall, the main novel contributions70
of this paper can be summarised as follows:
• An optimisation model is developed for production, distribution and capacity planning of
three-echelon supply chain networks;
• Two fairness criteria are defined for supply chain profit distribution;
• Bargaining powers of supply chain members are considered under the two fairness criteria;75
• MILP-based solution approaches are developed using literature game theoretic principles un-
der the two fairness criteria;
• A tailored hierarchical solution approach is proposed for max-min fair solutions, with advan-
tage in efficiency for large instances;
• Two examples, including a large real world supply chain network in agrochemical industry,80
are investigated.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the problem statement, while
the mathematical formulation of the proposed model is described in Section 3. The definitions of
5
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fairness criteria and the development of fair solution approaches in Section 4. In Section 5, two
examples are described, followed by the computational results and discussion in Section 6. Finally,85
some concluding remarks are drawn in Section 7.
2. Problem Statement
In this work, a three-echelon supply chain network of one active ingredient (AI) in a process
industry, such as pharmaceutical, and chemical industry, is considered, consisting of AI plants,
formulation plants and markets, as illustrated in Figure 1. At the primary manufacturing stage, one90
AI, which is the substance biologically or chemically active within the products and is the specific
component responsible for the desired effect of the products, e.g. drugs and pesticides, considered
in the problem. The considered AI, a low-volume high-value product, is produced centrally in
few AI plants, and then shipped to different formulation plants, where different final products
are produced in secondary manufacture, according to different recipes, formulation, packaging and95
labelling requirements. It is assumed that each formulation plant can only be able to produce the
products belonging to certain product groups, depending on its production capability. At last,
final products are shipped to various markets for sales to customers. Considering the potential
advantages of certain supply chain members to attain higher profits than others, it is assumed that
the involved supply chain members may have different bargaining powers.100
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Figure 1: Supply chain network example of an AI.
The production, distribution and capacity planning of this three-echelon supply chain network is
addressed in this work. It is assumed that the existing capacities of the AI plants and formulation
plants cannot satisfy rapidly increased demand. Thus, capacity increment strategies are to be
optimised, as well as production and distribution planning decisions.
The division of costs among supply chain members can be much different, depending on contracts105
and agreements on transportation responsibilities. In this work, we consider all trades are on Ex
Works basis (International Chamber of Commerce, 2010), in which all costs and risks involved in
taking the goods from the seller’s premises are the obligation of the buyer or customer (Monczka
et al., 2011). Note that the proposed model in this work can be easily modified to accommodate
other trade responsibilities. The AI plants are responsible for AI’s raw materials cost, AI production110
cost, AI inventory cost, and capital investment cost. The costs of formulation plants include the
payments to AI plants to purchase the AI, raw materials cost, product formulation cost, inventory
costs of both AI and products, AI transportation cost from AI plants to formulation plants, capital
investment cost, and duties paid for AI importation. Each market pays for the purchase of products
7
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to formulation plants, product inventory, product transportation from formulation plants, duties115
for product importation, and unfulfilled demand.
The revenues of the AI and formulation plants come from the transfer payments from formulation
plants and markets, respectively. Thus, transfer prices of the AI from AI plants to formulation
plants, and those of products from formulation plants to markets, have significant effects on the
profit of each member in the supply chain network. The transfer pricing decisions are to be optimised120
in this problem, based on given discrete penitential price levels and the bargaining powers of supply
chain members. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the final selling prices of the products at markets
are known.
In this problem, we aim to achieve a fair profit distribution among the supply chain members.
Here, to define a fair profit distribution, we adopt two broadly accepted fairness criteria: propor-125
tional fairness and max-min fairness. In this work, a proportionally fair profit distribution is the
one that any profit transfer leads to no increase in total proportional change of profit, while in a
max-min fair profit distribution, any feasible profit increase of one member reduces the profit of an
equal or less profitable member.
In summary, this optimisation problem can be described as follows:130
Given are:
• supply chain network of an AI, consisting of AI plants, formulation plants, and markets;
• products and their products groups;
• capabilities and capacities of AI and formulation plants;
• product demands at markets;135
• unit consumption of AI consumption for each product formulation;
• fixed and variable costs of AI production, product formulation, and transportation;
• transportation times of AI and products;
• unit raw materials cost, inventory cost, duties of AI and products;
• unit capital cost for capacity expansion at AI and formulation plants;140
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• minimum and maximum AI/product production and transportation flows;
• lost sales penalty of products;
• potential transfer price levels of AI and products;
• selling prices of products at markets;
• bargaining powers of supply chain members;145
to determine:
• transfer prices of AI and products;
• productions of AI and products;
• distribution flows of AI and products;
• capacity increments of AI and formulation plants;150
• inventory levels of AI and products at plants and markets;
• sales of products at markets;
so as to maximise the total profit of the supply chain network with a fair distribution to its
members, under proportional and max-min fairness .
3. Mathematical Formulation155
The proposed optimisation model for the fair profit distribution problem is extended from a
literature supply chain optimisation model (Liu & Papageorgiou, 2013), which only considered total
cost of the whole supply chain as objective function, and ignored transfer prices between supply
chain members. In this work, considering a three-echelon supply chain, consisting of AI plants,
formulation plants, and markets, each member is an individual profit centre, and its profit is aimed160
to be optimised to achieve a fair solution distribution through transfer prices. The definitions of all
mathematical symbols used are given in the Nomenclature.
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3.1. Production Constraints
If the AI is produced at AI plant a during time period t, its production amount, PAat, is restricted
by given minimum (MinPAa ) and maximum (MaxP
A
a ) production limits, which are determined by
production rates and operating time limits of the machines.
MinPAa ·WAat ≤ PAat ≤MaxPAa ·WAat, ∀a, t (1)
where WAat is a binary variable indicating whether the AI is produced at AI plant a in time period
t.165
Similarly, the production amount of product i produced at formulation plant j during time
period t, PPijt, is limited by upper and lower bounds (MinP
P
ij and MaxP
P
ij ). By using the binary
variable WPijt (=1 if the product i produced at formulation plant j during time period t), we have
the following constraints:
MinPPij ·WPijt ≤ PPijt ≤MaxPPij ·WPijt, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g, t (2)
where Gj refers to the set of product groups g that can be formulated in plant j, and I¯g indicates
the set of products belonging to product group g.
3.2. Capacity Constraints
The total production at each AI and formulation plant is limited by its existing capacity (CapAa
for AI plant a and CapFj for formulation plant j), plus any corresponding capacity increment
(∆CapAa and ∆Cap
F
j , respectively), which are to be optimised.
PAat ≤ CapAa + ∆CapAa , ∀a, t (3)
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
PPijt ≤ CapFj + ∆CapFj , ∀j, t (4)
10
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Note that some capacity expansion strategies (Liu & Papageorgiou, 2013) can be addressed by
this model with additional constraints.170
3.3. Flow Constraints
When there exists a shipment of the AI from AI plant a to formulation plant j during time period
t, i.e. binary variable Y Aajt = 1, the shipped flow amount (F
A
ajt) cannot go beyond its minimum
(MinFAaj) and maximum (MaxF
A
aj) limits.
MinFAaj · Y Aajt ≤ FAajt ≤MaxFAaj · Y Aajt, ∀a, j, t (5)
Similarly, for the transported amount of product i from formulation plant j to market k during
time period t, FPijkt, the following constraints are proposed:
MinFPijk · Y Pijkt ≤ FPijkt ≤MaxFPijk · Y Pijkt, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik, t (6)
where binary variable Y Pijkt is 1 if product i is shipped from formulation plant j to market k
during time period t; MaxFPijk and MinF
P
ijk are corresponding maximum and minimum limits,
respectively; and Ik represents the set of products sold in market k.
3.4. Inventory Constraints175
The inventory considered in this problem includes AI inventory at both AI plants and formula-
tion plants, and product inventory at both formulation plants and markets, as illustrated in Figure
(2)
Figure 2: Illustration of the inventory of the AI and products.
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The AI inventory at AI plant a in time period t (IV AAat ) is equal to the inventory in the previous
time period (IV AAa,t−1), plus local AI production amount (P
A
at), minus total outgoing AI flows to
formulation plants (FAajt):
IV AAat = IV
AA
a,t−1 + P
A
at −
∑
j
FAajt, ∀a, t (7)
The AI inventory at formulation plant j at the end of each time period (IV AFjt ) equals the AI
inventory at the end of the previous time period (IV AFj,t−1), plus arriving AI flows from AI plants
(FAaj,t−τ¯aj ), minus AI consumption for product production (P
P
ijkt):
IV AFjt = IV
AF
j,t−1 +
∑
a
FAaj,t−τ¯aj −
∑
i∈I¯g
∑
g∈Gj
βij · PPijt, ∀j, t (8)
where τ¯aj refers to the transportation time from AI plant a to formulation plant j
The inventory of product i at formulation plant j by the end of each time period (IV PFijt ) is
calculated by its inventory at the end of the previous time period (IV PFij,t−1), product production
(PPijt) and the total outgoing flows to the markets (F
P
ijkt) in that time period:
IV PFijt = IV
PF
ij,t−1 + P
P
ijt −
∑
k∈Ki
FPijkt, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g, t (9)
where Ki indicates the set of markets that sell product i.180
Similarly, the inventory of product i at market k in time period t (IV PMijt ) is equal to the product
inventory in the previous time period (IV PMij,t−1), plus any incoming flows from formulation plants
(FPijk,t−τjk), minus local sales in the same time period (Sikt) :
IV PMikt = IV
PM
ik,t−1 +
∑
j∈Jg
∑
g∈G¯i
FPijk,t−τjk − Sikt, ∀k, i ∈ Ik, t (10)
where τjk refers to the transportation time between formulation plant j and market k; G¯i indicates
the set of product groups including product i; Jg expresses the set of formulation plants capable
12
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for the production of product group g.
The above inventory is limited by corresponding lower and upper bounds, where upper bounds
are often resulted from storage capacities, and lower bounds are usually considered as safety stocks
for demand uncertainty.
MinIV AAa ≤ IV AAat ≤MaxIV AAa , ∀a, t (11)
MinIV AFj ≤ IV AFjt ≤MaxIV AFj , ∀j, t (12)
MinIV PFij ≤ IV PFijt ≤MaxIV PFij , ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g, t (13)
MinIV PMik ≤ IV PMikt ≤MaxIV PMik , ∀k, i ∈ Ik, t (14)
3.5. Transfer Price Constraints
Transfer prices of the AI between AI plants and formulation plants (TPAa ), as well as those of
products between formulation plants and markets (TPPij ), are considered as decision variables. It
is assumed that each AI plant charges the same transfer price to all formulation plants. Similarly,
for each product, each formulation plant sets a single transfer price to all markets. In addition, the
determined transfer prices do not change throughout the considered planning horizon. Following
the work of Gjerdrum et al. (2001), a set of candidate transfer price levels of the AI and products
are set by each member within the range allowed by the rules and regulations of authorities, which
is reasonable in real practice. Here, only one transfer price level of the AI (TPLAal) can be chosen
by each AI plant, if the production occurs there. Similarly, only one transfer price level of each
product (TPLPijl) is selected by each formulation plant producing it. In the following constraints,
binary variables OAal and O
P
ijl indicate whether price level l is selected or not, and E
A
al and E
P
ijl are
13
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for the production allocation of the AI and products, respectively.
TPAa =
∑
l
TPLAal ·OAal, ∀a (15)
TPPij =
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OPijl, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (16)
∑
l
OAal = E
A
a , ∀a (17)
∑
l
OPijl = E
P
ij , ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (18)
3.6. Lost Sales Constraints185
The lost sales (LSikt) of product i in market k in each time period is the difference between
corresponding demand (Dikt) and sales amount (Sikt):
LSikt = Dikt − Sikt, ∀k, i ∈ Ik, t (19)
3.7. Logical Constraints
If AI plant a is not chosen for AI production, its production amount is always zero.
∑
t
WAat ≤| t | ·EAa , ∀a (20)
Similarly, if a link from AI plant a to formulation plant j is not allocated for AI shipment, there
is no AI flow on this link in all time periods.
∑
t
Y Aajt ≤| t | ·XAaj , ∀a, j (21)
When AI plant a is not allocated for AI production, the link from AI plant a to any formulation
14
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plant j is not used for AI shipment.
∑
j
XAaj ≤| j | ·EAa , ∀a (22)
If formulation plant j is not allocated for the production of product i, there is no production of
product i at formulation plant j.
∑
t
WPijt ≤| t | ·EPij , ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (23)
When a link from formulation plant j to market k is not allocated for the shipment of product
i , the flow of product i on this link is zero in all time period t.
∑
t
Y Pijkt ≤| t | ·XPijk, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik (24)
If formulation plant j is not used to produce product i, then there is no flow of product i from
formulation plant j to any market k.
∑
k∈Ki
XPijk ≤| k | ·EPij , ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (25)
3.8. Profit Constraints
The total profit of the supply chain network is the sum of the profits of AI plants (PrAa ),
formulation plants (PrFj ) and markets (Pr
M
k ).
TotalPr =
∑
a
PrAa +
∑
j
PrFj +
∑
k
PrMk (26)
Next, the profit of each supply chain member is formulated in the following subsections.
15
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3.8.1. AI plants
At an AI plant, its revenue (ReAa ) is the total transfer payment from formulation plants, i.e., the
AI transfer prices multiplied by corresponding flows between the AI plant and formulation plants:
ReAa =
∑
t
∑
j
TPAa · FAajt, ∀a (27)
Note that Eq. (27) is a nonlinear equation, which is reformulated to be linear below using
auxiliary variables and constraints and Eq. (15):
OF
A
ajlt ≤MaxFAaj ·OAal, ∀a, j, l, t (28)
∑
l
OF
A
ajlt = F
A
ajt, ∀a, j, t (29)
ReAa =
∑
t
∑
j
∑
l
TPLAal ·OF
A
ajlt, ∀a (30)
The costs of AI plants include raw materials cost (RMCAa ), production cost (PC
A
a ), inventory
cost (IV CAa ), and capital investment cost (CIC
A
a ):
RMCAa =
∑
t
MCAa · PAat, ∀a (31)
PCAa = FPC
A
a · EAa +
∑
t
V PCAa · PAat, ∀a (32)
IV CAa =
∑
t
ICAAa · IV AAat , ∀a (33)
CICAa = crf · CCAa ·∆CapAa , ∀a (34)
16
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The profit of an AI plant (PrAa ) is equal to its revenue minus all above costs.
PrAa = Re
A
a −RMCAa − PCAa − IV CAa − CICAa , ∀a (35)
3.8.2. Formulation plants190
The revenue of a formulation plant (ReFj ) include all transfer payments from markets, deter-
mined by product transfer prices and corresponding flows from this formulation plant to markets:
ReFj =
∑
t
∑
g∈Gj
∑
k
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
TPPijk · FPijkt, ∀j (36)
Similar to Eq. (27), the nonlinear Eq. (36) can be linearised as follows:
OF
P
ijklt ≤MaxFPijk ·OPijl, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik, l, t (37)
∑
l
OF
P
ijklt = F
P
ijkt, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik, t (38)
ReFj =
∑
t
∑
k
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OF
P
ijklt, ∀j (39)
The costs incurred at formulation plants include transfer payment cost to AI plants (TPCFj ),
raw materials cost (RMCFj ), formulation cost (FOC
F
j ), inventory cost (IV C
F
j ), AI transportation
cost (TRCFj ), capital investment cost (CIC
F
j ) and duties (DUC
F
j ).
TPCFj =
∑
t
∑
a
∑
l
TPLAal ·OF
A
ajlt, ∀j (40)
RMCFj =
∑
t
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
MCPij · PPijt, ∀j (41)
17
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FOCFj =
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
FFCPij · EPij +
∑
t
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
V FCPij · PPijt, ∀j (42)
IV CFj =
∑
t
ICAFj · IV AFjt +
∑
t
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
ICPFij · IV PFijt , ∀j (43)
TRCFj =
∑
a
FTCAaj ·XAaj +
∑
t
∑
a
V TCAaj · FAajt, ∀j (44)
CICFj = crf · CCFj ·∆CapFj , ∀j (45)
DUCFj =
∑
t
∑
a
∑
l
DCAaj · TPLAal ·OF
A
ajlt, ∀j (46)
Then, the profit of a formulation plant (PrFj ) is as follows:
PrFj = Re
F
j − TPCFj −RMCFj − FOCFj − IV CFj − TRCFj − CICFj −DUCFj , ∀j (47)
3.8.3. Markets
The revenue of each market (ReMk ) is given by the selling prices of product i in market k (Vik)
and corresponding sales amounts:
ReMk =
∑
t
∑
i∈Ik
Vik · Sikt, ∀k (48)
The costs incurred at each market include transfer payment cost to formulation plants (TPCMk ),
inventory cost (IV CMk ), product transportation cost (TRC
M
k ), duties (DUC
M
k ) and lost sales cost
(LSCMk ).
TPCMk =
∑
t
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OF
P
ijklt, ∀k (49)
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IV CMk =
∑
t
∑
i∈Ik
ICPMik · IV PMikt , ∀k (50)
TRCMk =
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
FTCPijk ·XPijk +
∑
t
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
V TCPijk · FPijkt, ∀k (51)
DUCMk =
∑
t
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
DCPijk · TPLPijl ·OF
P
ijklt, ∀k (52)
LSCMk =
∑
t
∑
i∈Ik
PCik · LSikt, ∀k (53)
Then, the profit of each market (PrMk ) is given by Eq. (54):
PrMk = Re
M
k − TPCMk − IV CMk − TRCMk −DUCMk − LSCMk , ∀k (54)
Considering the maximisation of the total supply chain profit, the MILP model (denoted as
MaxTotProf), consisting of Eq. (26) as objective function and Eqs. (1)–(25), (28)–(35), (37)–(54)
as constraints, is to be solved. To achieve a fair profit distribution strategy with the maximum
total profit, some solution approaches are developed in the next section.195
4. Fair Solution Approaches
In this section, we first discuss the two fairness criteria considered in this work, based on
literature fairness schemes. Then, game theoretical solution approaches are developed for fair
solutions under the two fairness criteria.
4.1. Fairness Criteria200
There exists extensive literature work on the fairness of allocation problems, mostly in the
fields of economics, social science, and engineering. Although there is no unique fairness criterion
wholly recognised, due to widely distinctive problem characteristics and interpretation of fairness,
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most fairness criteria are based on some general theories of justice and equity, including, but not
limited to, Aristotles equity principle, classical utilitarianism, and Rawlsian justice (Sen, 1973;205
Young, 1995). In this work, we focus on two widely accepted and extensive studied fairness criteria:
proportional fairness and max-min fairness (Kelly et al., 1998; Bonald et al., 2006; Bertsimas et al.,
2011).
Proportional fairness considers an allocation between multiple players to be fair, if the total
proportional change of utility is no greater than zero when compared to any other feasible alloca-
tions. This criterion was firstly proposed by Kelly (1997) based on changing rate control for elastic
traffic in computer network services, and was widely studied afterwards. It can be regarded as an
extension of Nash solution for a two-person bargaining game (Nash, 1950), simultaneously satis-
fying four axioms for fairness criterion, including Pareto optimality, symmetry, affine invariance,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives (Conley & Wilkie, 1996). Considering a proportionally
fair profit distribution in this problem, we take into account the excess profit, i.e. the profit higher
than a specific minimum acceptable profit level, defined by Prn−MinPrn, where Prn is the profit
earned by supply chain member n (= PrAa , Pr
F
j and Pr
M
k when n = a, j and k, respectively),
and MinPrn is the minimum acceptable profit of supply chain member n. A proportionally fair
profit distribution is defined as a profit distribution that any profit transfer does not benefit total
proportional change of excess profit, i.e.:
∑
n
Prn − Prpfn
Prpfn −MinPrn
≤ 0 (55)
where Prpfn is the optimal profit of member n in a proportionally fair profit distribution. A propor-
tionally fair solution can be achieved using the Nash bargaining approach, which will be described210
later in this section.
Max-min fairness is based on the work of Rawlsian justice (Rawls, 1971) and Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975). An allocation among multiple players is regarded
to be max-min fair, if any increase in the allocation of one player can result in the allocation decrease
of another player with an equal or less allocation. Max-min fairness satisfies the axioms of Pareto
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optimality, symmetry, affine invariance, and monotonicity. Originally proposed for a two-person
game, it is usually operated in a normalised system in which all players have the same maximum
achievable utility. Under max-min fairness, a fair allocation solution is achieved by maximising
the lowest utility first, then the second lowest utility, and so on. The max-min fairness has a
broad and extensive application in the area of networking and telecommunications (Bertsekas &
Gallager, 1987; Luss, 1999). In this work, the scaled profit of each member is considered under
max-min fairness, which is obtained by considering the maximum and minimum profit bounds of
each member:
Prn =
Prn −MinPrn
MaxPrn −MinPrn , ∀n (56)
where MaxPrn is the maximum profit of supply chain member n. A max-min fair profit distribution
is the one that any scaled profit increase of one member cause the scaled profit decrease of another
member with the same or less scaled profit. Lexicographic maximin approach can be used to obtain
such max-min fair solution, whose details can be found later.215
Next, we developed solutions approaches for this fair profit distribution problem, using Nash
bargaining and lexicographic maximin principles, under proportional and max-min fairness criteria,
respectively.
4.2. Nash Bargaining Approach
The Nash bargaining approach is applied to obtain the proportionally fair solutions. Originated
from the two-player bargaining game, the Nash bargaining solution is defined as the maximiser
of Nash product, i.e. the product of the two players’ payoffs (Nash, 1950). The Nash bargaining
approach has been used to achieve fair solutions in various areas (Gjerdrum et al., 2001, 2002;
Che´ron, 2002; Han et al., 2005; Hanany & Gerchak, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2012; Yu
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013, 2017a). In our supply chain optimisation problem, a fair Nash
bargaining solution can be obtained by maximising the product of each member’s excess profit.
Thus, taking into account the bargaining powers of the supply chain members, the Nash bargaining
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solution can be obtained by optimising the following objective function:
Ψ =
∏
n
(Prn −MinPrn)αn (57)
where αn is the indicator of the bargaining power of member n.220
By applying the logarithmic operation, the above nonlinear objective function (Eq. 57) can be
rewritten as the following one:
ln Ψ =
∑
n
αn · ln(Prn −MinPrn) (58)
Eq. (58) is still a nonlinear function. To linearise it, the separable programming technique
(Gjerdrum et al., 2001) was applied. Then, the continuous strictly convex function ln Ψ can be
approximated by a piecewise linear function ln Ψ with Q grid points, as follows:
ln Ψ =
∑
n
Q∑
q=1
αn · µq · ln(Prnq −MinPrn) (59)
where Prnq expresses the profit of supply chain member n at grid point q, and variables µq ≥ 0 is
a SOS2 variable, allowing vales at only two adjacent grid points to be non-zero, and satisfying the
following constraint:
Q∑
q=1
µq = 1 (60)
Thus, Prn can be expressed as below:
Prn =
Q∑
q=1
µq · Prnq, ∀n (61)
Overall, the developed MILP model, denoted as Nash, includes Eq. (59) as objective function,
and Eqs. (1)–(25), (28)–(35), (37)–(54), (60) and (61) as constraints. The solution of the above
MILP model can be regarded as a close approximation to the optimal Nash bargaining solution
(Gjerdrum et al., 2001), as well as a proportionally fair solution.
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4.3. Lexicographic Maximin Approach225
Lexicographic maximin (or minimax) approach is a game theoretic approach for max-min fair
solutions with wide applications (Klein et al., 1992; Ogryczak, 1997; Ogryczak et al., 2003; Erkut
et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Luss, 2010; Liu & Papageorgiou, 2013; Sawik, 2014; Zhang et al.,
2014, 2017b). A lexicographic maximin problem can be defined as follows:
Leximaxx∈ΩΘ(f (x )) (62)
where f (x ) = {f1(x ), f2(x ), . . . , fN (x )} is a vector function on the decision space x ∈ Ω, and
Θ : RN → RN is a mapping function that re-rank the components of vector in a nondecreasing
order, such that Θ(f (x )) = (θ1(f (x )), θ2(f (x )), . . . , θN (f (x ))), where θ1(f (x )) ≤ θ2(f (x )) ≤ · · · ≤
θN (f (x )), and there exists an permutation pi of set {1, . . . , N} such that θn(f (x )) = fpi(n)(x ).
Taking bargaining powers into account, the ratio of scaled profit to bargain power of each
member is maximised for this problem. Thus, the lexicographic maximin problem for max-min fair
profit distribution can be described as follows:
Leximax Θ(Prn/αn)
s.t. Eqs. (1)− (25), (28)− (35), (37)− (54) and (56)
(63)
4.3.1. Lexicographic Maximisation Model230
According to Ogryczak et al. (2005), the lexicographic maximin optimisation problem (Eq. 63)
can be transformed into a lexicographic maximisation problem, denoted by LexiMax in this paper,
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whose solution process involves solving a series of MILP models iteratively:
Leximax {λ1 −
∑
n
d1n, . . . , λN − 1
N
·
∑
n
dNn}
s.t. λp − dpn ≤ Prn/αn, ∀p = 1, . . . , N, n
λp ∈ R, ∀p = 1, . . . , N
dpn ≥ 0, ∀p = 1, . . . , N, n
Eqs. (1)− (25), (28)− (35), (37)− (54) and (56)
(64)
4.3.2. An Alternative Hierarchical Approach
Due to the involvement of multiple iterations and increasing model sizes, the above lexicographic
maximisation approach for large supply chain networks requires high computational expense to
solve. To overcome the computational difficulties, an efficient tailored hierarchical approach is
developed to obtain an approximate optimal fair solution, which denoted as hLexi. In the proposed235
hLexi approach, an aggregated static lexicographic maximin problem is solved first as a lexicographic
maximisation problem for fair profit distribution to obtain the optimal scaled profit of member n,
Pr
∗
n. This aggregated model ignores the time discretisation and only considers the aggregated
decisions of total productions, flows and sales in the planning horizon. The details of the developed
aggregated model are presented in the Appendix.240
Next, a detailed dynamic optimisation model is solved by maximising total profit. This model
is extended from MaxTotProf model by including two additional constraints: Eq. (56) and a
profit ratio limit constraint, in which the profit distributions obtained by the aggregated model are
considered as the limits, i.e. the relative ratio of the scaled profits of a pair of members, n and n′, is
restricted by their ratio obtained in the aggregated model, with an allowed deviation δ, as follows:
(1− δ) · Pr
∗
n
Pr
∗
n′
· Prn′ ≤ Prn ≤ (1 + δ) · Pr
∗
n
Pr
∗
n′
· Prn′ , ∀n, n′ > n (65)
The solution procedure of the hierarchical approach hLexi is given below:
Step 1: Solve the proposed aggregated model using lexicographic maximin approach, and
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obtain the optimal scaled profit earned by each member, Pr
∗
n;
Step 2: Solve a detailed MILP model for total profit maximisation with the fixed values of
Pr
∗
n.245
Overall, the above three game theoretic approaches were used for the optimal profit distribution
problem. The Nash bargaining approach using separable programming (Nash) is implemented for
a proportionally fair profit distribution, and the lexicographic maximin approach through lexico-
graphic maximisation model (LexiMax) and the proposed hierarchical approach (hLexi) are used
for a max-min fair profit distribution.250
5. Examples
In this section, two examples are presented to demonstrate the applicability of the developed fair
decision framework. Example 1 is a small illustrative example to justify the fair profit distributions
obtained by the proposed approaches and the roles of transfer prices. Example 2 is based on a real
world case study in agrochemical industry to demonstrate applicability of the proposed approaches255
at real practice. Here, cu is used as the currency unit and mu as the mass unit.
5.1. Example 1
Example 1 is a supply chain network consisting of one AI plant (A1), two formulation plants
(F1–F2), and four market regions (M1–M4), as shown in Figure 1. This example considers eight
products (P1–P8), with the first four in one product group (G1) produced by formulation plant F1260
and the last four in another product group (G2) produced by formulation plant F2. The planning
horizon is divided into 6 time periods (T1–T6), with each lasting for 2 months. The unit AI
consumptions of product production are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Unit consumption of the AI in product formulation of Example 1
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
F1 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.20 - - - -
F2 - - - - 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.13
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In this example, there are 10 discrete potential transfer price levels (L1–L10) of the AI and
each product. The given discrete potential transfer price levels of each product are the same at all265
formulation plants. The selling prices of final products at markets are assumed to be constant in
the planning horizon, which are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Product selling prices (cu/mu) in Example 1.
M1 M2 M3 M4
P1 180 160 170 180
P2 200 180 220 190
P3 240 230 200 210
P4 190 200 170 190
P5 180 210 190 200
P6 220 240 210 210
P7 150 180 200 190
P8 220 200 210 200
5.2. Example 2
Example 2 considers a real world supply chain network in the agrochemical industry, based on
the example in (Liu & Papageorgiou, 2013). It consists of one AI plant (A1), eight formulation270
plants (F1–F8) and ten market regions (M1–M10). There are 32 products (P1–P32) in 10 product
groups (G1–G10). The planning horizon is divided into 52 weekly time periods (T1–T52). The
capabilities of the formulation plants are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Capabilities and capacities (mu) of the formulation plants in Example 2.
Product group (product)
Formulation plant
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
G1 (P1–P4) - - - X* - X - X
G2 (P5–P6) X X - - - - X -
G3 (P7–P10) - X X X X - X X
G4 (P11–P14) X - - - X X - -
G5 (P15–P20) - X - - - X - -
G6 (P21–P22) - X - - X - - -
G7 (P23–P25) X - X X - - - X
G8 (P26–P27) - - - - - X X -
G9 (P28–P30) - - X - X - - -
G10 (P31–P32) X - - - - X - X
*The formlation plant is able to produce corresponding product groups.
Similar to Example 1, there exit 10 transfer price levels (L1–L10) for the AI and each product.
Note each product is sold only in some markets with different selling prices. The annual demand and275
selling price of each product in each market is given in Figures 3 and 4, where the most demanded
products are P2 and P3, while markets M2 and M4 have the most potential sales.
Figure 3: Product demands at each market in Example 2.
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Figure 4: Selling prices of the products at each market in Example 2.
In both Examples 1 and 2, the maximum profit limit of each member was achieved by optimising
its own profit only, while the minimum acceptable profit was set to a certain percentage of the
maximum profit (30% in Example 1 and 10% in Example 2).280
6. Computational Results and Discussion
In this section, three game theoretic approaches are applied to the two examples presented
above, including the MILP model for Nash bargaining solution (Nash), lexicographic maximisation
model (LexiMax) and hierarchical lexicographic approach (hLexi). The obtained fair solutions are
compared with the solution of MaxTotProf model for total profit maximisation to demonstrate their285
advantages.
All implementations in this paper were done in GAMS 24.5 (GAMS Development Corporation,
2015) on a 64-bit Windows 7 based machine with 3.00 GHz Intel Core i5-3330 processor and 8.0
GB RAM, using CPLEX MILP solver with four threads. The optimality gap was set to 1%. A
CPU limit of 10000s was used for each single MILP model run. The value of δ used in the hLexi290
approach is 20%, unless specified otherwise.
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6.1. Example 1
In Example 1, two scenarios with different bargaining powers are investigated to examine the
impact of bargaining powers. The model statistics of different approaches for Example 1 are pre-
sented in Table 4. All approaches have similar numbers of equations and variables, except the295
aggregated model at Step 1 of hLexi approach, which has one order of magnitude fewer equations
and variables, and results in much shorter computational time.
Table 4: Model statistics in Example 1
MaxTotProf Nash LexiMax hLexi
No. of equations 2326 2341 2410* 500**/2382***
No. of continuous variables 1740 1811 1881* 504**/1754***
No. of discrete variables 307 307 307* 143**/307***
*Last iteration; **Aggregated model at the last iteration of Step 1; ***Detailed model at Step 2.
6.1.1. Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, it is assumed that all supply chain members have the same bargaining power.
Without loss of generality, we let αn = 1. The obtained profits of all members are shown in300
Table 5, which also demonstrates the effect of fairness criterion on profit distribution. The total
profit achieved by MaxTotProf model is the highest. However, the profits of formulation plants are
negative, and the profits of markets reach the maximum limits, implying that the profit distribution
is very uneven. Meanwhile, for other game theoretic solution approaches, the obtained total profit
is only 3-4% less than the maximum total profit, while the profits of all supply chain members305
are within the same scale, varying between 23.0 and 55.0 thousand cu. Comparing the optimal
solutions of Nash and LexiMax approaches, only formulation plant F2 earns more profit in the
lexicographic maximin optimum, than in the Nash optimum, due to its higher maximum profit
bound than others, which is taken into account in scaled profits.
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Table 5: Optimal profits of supply chain members in Scenario 1 of Example 1, in cu.
MaxTotProf Nash LexiMax hLexi
A1 20.9 25.2 23.0 23.0
F1 -4.7 43.0 39.9 39.9
F2 -3.5 38.6 54.2 55.0
M1 59.6 35.0 33.0 33.0
M2 88.2 52.9 48.9 46.2
M3 61.9 37.1 34.7 35.9
M4 44.5 26.7 24.8 24.7
Total profit (thousand cu) 266.8 258.6 258.6 257.7
CPU (s) 0.3 3.9 78.7 2.7 (1.2*/1.5**)
*Step 1; **Step 2.
To further demonstrate the fairness of the obtained profit distributions, they are compared310
under two fairness criteria: proportional fairness and max-min fairness. The proportional fairness
is demonstrated by excess profit (Prn −MinPrn) in Figure 5, showing that the fluctuations of
excess profits by Nash approach are much smaller than those by MaxTotProf model. The max-min
fairness is illustrated using scaled profit (Prn) in Figure 6, which demonstrates more fluctuations
of scaled profit by MaxTotProf model. Especially, the minimum scaled profits of all members in315
the solutions of LexiMax and hLexi approaches are significantly higher than that of MaxTotProf
model, and therefore their profit distributions much max-min fairer.
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Figure 5: Proportional fairness: excess profits, Prn −MinPrn, by MaxTotProf and Nash approaches in Example 1,
in thousand cu.
Figure 6: Max-min fairness: scaled profits, Prn, by MaxTotProf, LexiMax and hLexi approaches in Example 1.
In order to measure the fairness of the obtained profit distributions, we introduce the coefficient
of variation as a fairness index (FI) of profit distribution. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of
standard deviation to mean, expressed as a percentage, which has been widely used in the literature320
as a fairness measure. Here, a lower value of FI indicates a fairer profit distribution. Table 6 shows
the values of FI of the obtained profit distributions by different approaches. Under proportional
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fairness, FI indicates the coefficient of variation of excess profits, while under max-min fairness,
FI represents the coefficient of variation of scaled profits. In terms of proportional fairness, Nash
approach reduces the FI values to 31.4%, from 185.0% obtained by MaxTotProf model. Meanwhile,325
the FI value under max-min fairness obtained by LexiMax approach is two orders of magnitude
lower than that maximising total profit. Such result shows that Nash and LexiMax approaches
can effectively achieve proportionally and max-min fairer solutions, respectively. Comparing the
profit distributions of LexiMax and hLexi approaches, it can be observed that hLexi approach can
provide a close approximation to the max-min fair solution with one order of magnitude saving in330
computational time.
Table 6: FI of profit distributions in Scenario 1 of Example 1
Proportional fairness Max-min fairness
MaxTotProf Nash MaxTotProf LexiMax hLexi
185.0% 31.4% 139.6% 1.6% 6.2%
The optimal transfer price levels in the fair solutions are shown in Figure 7. When maximising
total profit, lower transfer prices are preferred in order to minimise cost of duties. Thus, transfer
price level M1 is selected for the AI and all products, causing low or negative profits to plant A1
and all formulation plants, and high profits to all markets. In the solutions of three game theoretic335
approaches, the selected AI transfer price levels becomes higher to increase the profit of A1. In
addition, the product transfer prices are also increased, even to the highest level M10 for some
products, which results in higher profits of formulation plants and lower profits of markets. It
can be noticed that different solution approaches might choose different transfer prices for some
products. The results demonstrate that the transfer pricing decisions have an important role in340
balancing profits of supply chain members and achieving a fair profit distribution.
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Figure 7: Optimal transfer price levels selected by different approaches in Scenario 1 of Example 1.
6.1.2. Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, the supply chain members do not have the same bargaining power. In order to
focus on the effect of bargaining powers, the AI plant is assumed to have a lower bargaining power
(αA1 = 0.5) than others (αn 6=A1 = 1). Similarly, the profit of each member is given in Table 7, in345
which all three game theoretic approaches obtain quite even profit distributions with up to 5% total
profit loss. Comparing Tables 7 with 5, A1 earns 9–22% less actual profit in Scenario 2 than in
Scenarios 1, due to its lower bargaining power, while most other members benefit from their relative
higher bargaining powers, receiving up to 11% higher profit. The hLexi approach still provides a
close approximation to the optimal max-min fair solution, taking significantly less computational350
time, compared to LexiMax approach.
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Table 7: Optimal fair profits of supply chain members in Scenario 2 of Example 1, in cu.
Nash LexiMax hLexi
A1 20.9 20.8 18.0
F1 43.3 40.5 38.5
F2 42.4 54.8 53.2
M1 35.7 33.4 35.2
M2 52.9 49.5 51.3
M3 37.1 34.7 35.2
M4 26.7 25.0 24.3
Total profit (cu) 259.1 258.7 255.6
CPU (s) 2.4 163.8 2.6 (1.4*/1.2**)
*Step 1; **Step 2.
The main driver of the obtained fair profit distribution is transfer pricing strategy, as shown in
Figure 8. Due to lower bargaining power of A1, AI transfer price to formulation plants is reduced to
the lowest level, M1, from levels M2 and M3 in Scenario 1. Thus, A1 receives less transfer payments
from formulation plants, and therefore earns a lower profit. Moreover, although Nash approach and355
the other two lexicographic optimisation-based approaches are under different fairness criteria, all
of them reduce the AI transfer price as a result of A1’s lower bargaining power.
Figure 8: Optimal transfer price levels selected by different approaches in Scenario 2 of Example 1.
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6.2. Example 2
In Example 2, all members are assumed to have the same bargaining power (αn = 1). The
model statistics of Example 2 are presented in Table 8. Compared to Example 1, the model sizes360
in Example 2 are tens of times larger, and therefore the models are much more computationally
difficult.
Table 8: Model statistics in Example 2
MaxTotProf Nash LexiMax hLexi
No of equations 152439 152478 152895* 3507**/152819***
No of continuous variables 114975 115166 137224* 3056**/115013***
No of discrete variables 15671 15671 15671* 1445**/15671***
*Last iteration; **Aggregated model at the last iteration of Step 1; ***Detailed model at Step 2.
6.2.1. Optimal Solutions
The computational results of Example 2 using the game theoretic approaches are presented in
Table 9. The obtained excess profits and scaled profits are demonstrated and compared in Figures 9365
and 10, respectively, and the FI values of profit distributions are given in Table 10. As the same as
Example 1, MaxTotProf model cannot achieve a fair profit distribution, in which all markets earn
negative profits, while only plants have positive profits. Meanwhile, the solution of hLexi approach
is much max-min fairer, as the obtained scaled profits are all positive. Nash approach obtains the
optimal solution within 1.3 hours, which has a much proportionally fairer profit distribution, with370
one order of magnitude reduction of FI than MaxTotProf model. Meanwhile, LexiMax approach
fails to find a feasible solution at the 4th iteration of lexicographic loop within the given CPU
limit, and therefore terminates without any solution returned after over 11-hour computation.
However, the proposed hierarchical approach, hLexi, finds a solution within about 1.5 hours, taking
a computational effort similar to Nash approach. The obtained solution also significantly reduces375
FI value by one order of magnitude from that by MaxTotProf model. Moreover, total profit of
the two fair solutions are within 3% of the maximum total profit obtained. Thus, the proposed
hierarchical approach successfully obtains a fair solution, regarded as a close approximation to the
optimal lexicographic maximin and max-min fair solution, with high total profit and computational
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efficiency.380
Table 9: Optimal profits of supply chain members in Example 2, in cu.
MaxTotProf Nash LexiMax hLexi
A1 -408.1 590.9 - 217.4
F1 599.3 780.6 - 1016.2
F2 1178.5 1430.6 - 1691.8
F3 1377.4 987.5 - 1269.6
F4 2175.8 2121.4 - 2711.9
F5 80.0 1018.4 - 1176.0
F6 1355.7 2263.9 - 2572.1
F7 644.8 971.7 - 1249.6
F8 340.3 1840.0 - 2113.5
M1 766.4 560.4 - 254.6
M2 3153.1 1072.3 - 930.5
M3 753.3 530.5 - 207.3
M4 1649.9 746.7 - 817.7
M5 295.2 393.6 - 136.4
M6 1228.4 625.7 - 498.9
M7 1231.8 480.3 - 358.9
M8 -33.1 481.1 - 145.5
M9 577.7 553.2 - 156.9
M10 1359.5 487.0 - 407.9
Total profit (cu) 18325.3 17935.9 -* 17932.8
CPU (s) 27.4 4446.5 40000.0 5447.6 (36.9**/5410.7***)
*No solution returned; **Step 1; ***Step 2.
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Figure 9: Excess profits, Prn −MinPrn, obtained by MaxTotProf and Nash approaches in Example 2, in thousand
cu.
Figure 10: Scaled profits, Prn, obtained by MaxTotProf and hLexi approaches in Example 2.
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Table 10: FI of profit distributions in Example 2
Proportional fairness Max-min fairness
MaxTotProf Nash MaxTotProf hLexi
132.4% 41.3% 140.1% 11.2%
Similar to Example 1, transfer price plays an important role in distributing profit more fairly.
Different from MaxTotProf model, which chooses the lowest transfer price level for the AI and all
the products, the obtained fair solutions use higher transfer prices. For example, in the max-min
fair solution by hLexi approach, level M6 is selected as AI transfer price, which makes A1 earn a
positive profit. Also, higher transfer prices of some products are chosen at formulation plants, e.g.,385
P1 and P31, whose transfer prices are set to level M10 at all three formulation plants where they
are produced. To earn a higher profit, F5, F6 and F8 assign transfer price level M10 to over three
quarters of the products they produced, resulting in the most significant profit increases, compared
to MaxTotProf solution. At the same time, the profit of F3 decreases, because it charged the lowest
average transfer price, and paid a higher AI transfer price.390
The optimal max-min fair transfer payments between supply chain members by hLexi approach
are visualised using Circos in Figure 11. In this figure, all 19 members of the supply chain network
are arranged circularly, and each one is represented by a colour and the label outside. The coloured
links connect two members and illustrate the transfer payments between them. The links are in
colour of the members who make the payments, and the width of each link is proportional to395
the transfer payment amount. On the outside of the ideogram, the cost and revenue from transfer
payments of each member and their total amount are represented by three tracks, respectively, with
percentage labels. In Figure 11, it can be observed that there are payments from all formulations
to the AI plant, and the largest payment comes from F4, around a quarter of the total revenue
of A1. As to the payments between formulation plants and markets, not every formulation plant400
is paid by all markets, and only four markets (M1, M2, M6 and M7) purchase products from all
formulation plants. The links with the largest payment include M4→F6, M6→F8, and M2→F4.
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Figure 11: Optimal transfer payments by hLexi approach in Example 2, in thousand cu.
Figure 12 illustrates the optimal production and flows by hLexi approach using Sankey diagram.
In this Sankey diagram, the four layers represent AI plants, formulation plants, products and mar-
kets. Each supply chain member and each product is represented by a block and a colour, and is405
labelled outside the block. The number after label represents the total production (for AI and for-
mulation plant) or sales (for market) of each member, or the total shipped amount of each product.
The links between AI plants between formulation plants represent AI flows, while the links between
formulation plants and products, as well as between products and markets, illustrate product flows
between formulation plants and markets, in colour of corresponding products. Comparing Figures410
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11 and 12, there are some interesting findings to link the optimal transfer payments and flows. In
Figure 12, there is large AI flow to F4, which is consistent with the high transfer payments from F4
to A1 in Figure 11. There are also large product flows between F6 and M4, especially for products
P13, P14, P18 and P20. Such fact explains over 70% of the revenue of F6 from M4, as illustrated in
Figure 11. Similar cases can be found at markets M8 and M9, whose most payments and flows are415
to a single formulation plant. In all formulation plants, F4 and F6 earn the highest total revenues
(Figure 11), as a result of their high productions than others (Figure 12), which lead to their relative
higher profits (Table 9). Meanwhile, M2 and M4 make the largest payments to formulation plants
(Figure 11), mainly because of their higher demands and sales (Figure 12). Similar results can also
be observed in the optimal proportionally fair solution by Nash approach.420
Figure 12: Optimal production and flows by hLexi approach in Example 2, in mu.
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6.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Next, we further investigated the proposed hLexi approach, by analysing the effects of the value
of parameter δ, the allowed deviation of pairwise relative profit ratios at Step 2 from those obtained
at Step 1, on profit distribution and computational time. Here, we tested three values of δ: 10%,
20% and 30%. Table 11 summarises the max-min fair solutions of Example 2 by hLexi approach425
using these three values of δ. It is obvious that with a decreasing value of δ, the obtained profit
distribution tends to be max-min fairer with smaller FI values. On the one side, for smaller value
of δ (10%), due to the constraint (Eq. 65) is tighter, it is more computationally difficult to find
the optimal solution at Step 2. On the other side, when the value of δ is higher (30%), as larger
feasible region is generated by Eq. (65), more computational time is needed to search for the430
optimal solution at Step 2. Total profits become higher with increasing values of δ in Table 11.
However, for a even higher value of δ > 30%, the model at Step 2 might not be able to find the
optimal solution within given CPU time limit, and then the achieved solution could have a lower
total profit and provide less proportionally fair distribution. It can be seen that 20% is able to
achieve a good balance between fairness and computational expense. Note that similar results can435
be found in Example 1 as well.
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis on the value of δ in Example 2
δ 10% 20% 30%
Total profit (thousand cu) 17917.9 17932.8 17941.7
FI of max-min fairness 8.9% 11.2% 13.5%
CPU at Step 2 (s) 10476.5 5410.7 6981.7
7. Conclusions
This work addressed the fair profit distribution problem within a three-echelon supply chain
network in the process industry, consisting of AI plants, formulation plants and markets with dif-
ferent bargaining powers. An MILP-based decision framework has been developed for production,440
distribution and capacity planning of the supply chain network. To achieve a fair profit distribution
among all supply chain members involved, game theoretic approaches using Nash bargaining and
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lexicographic maximin principles were adopted under two different fairness criteria, proportional
and max-min fairness. Especially, a tailored computationally efficient hierarchical approach has
been proposed for max-min fair solutions. Two examples were examined, and computational re-445
sults showed that both Nash bargaining and lexicographic maximin approachs can achieve fairer
profit distribution, compared to what obtained by maximising total profit, in terms of proportional
and max-min fairness, respectively. The effects of bargaining powers of supply chain members
on profit distribution were studied. For large instances where the classic iterative lexicographic
maximisation approach is highly time consuming, the proposed hierarchical approach is able to450
find good approximate optimal max-min fair profit distributions with much less computational ef-
forts. At last, through sensitivity analysis, the values of an important parameter in the proposed
hierarchical approach was investigated.
As to the future research directions, uncertainties of product demands can be considered and
incorporated into the optimisation. In addition, the competition between products in the same455
group at markets can be studied. More detailed planning and scheduling decisions at plants can
also be considered (Liu et al., 2008, 2010a,b, 2012). This work can be further extended to global
supply chain networks, considering additional features, e.g., different tax rates and exchange rates.
Acknowledgement
This work is supported by the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)460
under Grant EP/M027856/1.
Appendix
The aggregated model solved at Step 1 of the proposed hierarchical approach, hLexi, is presented
here. The static aggregated model determines the aggregated decisions of total production, flow
and sales without considering time discretisation. As only the total mass balance is considered, all465
inventory-related equations and variables are not included in this model. The constraints of the
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aggregated model are as follows:
APAa ≤ ACapAa + ∆ACapAa , ∀a, t (A.1)
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
APPij ≤ ACapFj + ∆ACapFj , ∀j (A.2)
MinAFAaj ·XAaj ≤ AFAajt ≤MaxAFAaj ·XAaj , ∀a, j (A.3)
MinAFPijk ·XPijk ≤ AFPijkt ≤MaxAFPijk ·XPijk, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik (A.4)
APAa =
∑
j
AFAaj , ∀a (A.5)
∑
a
AFAaj =
∑
i∈I¯g
∑
g∈Gj
βij ·APPij , ∀j (A.6)
APPij =
∑
k∈Ki
AFPijk, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (A.7)
∑
j∈Jg
∑
g∈G¯i
AFPijk = ASik, ∀k, i ∈ Ik (A.8)
TPAa =
∑
l
TPLAal ·OAal, ∀a (A.9)
TPPij =
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OPijl, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (A.10)
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∑
l
OAal = 1, ∀a (A.11)
∑
l
OPijl = 1, ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (A.12)
ALSik = ADik −ASik, ∀k, i ∈ Ik (A.13)
∑
j
XAaj ≤| j | ·EAa , ∀a (A.14)
∑
k∈Ki
XPijk ≤| k | ·EPij , ∀j, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g (A.15)
OAF
A
ajl ≤MaxAFAaj ·OAal, ∀a, j, l (A.16)
∑
l
OAF
A
ajl = AF
A
aj , ∀a, j (A.17)
ReAa =
∑
j
∑
l
TPLAal ·OAF
A
ajl, ∀a (A.18)
RMCAa = MC
A
a ·APAat, ∀a (A.19)
PCAa = FPC
A
a · EAa + V PCAa ·APAa , ∀a (A.20)
CICAa = crf · CCAa ·∆ACapAa , ∀a (A.21)
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PrAa = Re
A
a −RMCAa − PCAa − CICAa , ∀a (A.22)
OAF
P
ijkl ≤MaxAFPijk ·OPijl, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik, l (A.23)
∑
l
OAF
P
ijkl = AF
P
ijk, ∀j, k, g ∈ Gj , i ∈ I¯g ∩ Ik (A.24)
ReFj =
∑
k
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OAF
P
ijkl, ∀j (A.25)
PUCFj =
∑
a
∑
l
TPLAal ·OAF
A
ajl, ∀j (A.26)
RMCFj =
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
MCPij ·APPij , ∀j (A.27)
FOCFj =
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
FFCPij · EPij +
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g
V FCPij ·APPijt, ∀j (A.28)
TRCFj =
∑
a
FTCAaj ·XAaj +
∑
a
V TCAaj ·AFAaj , ∀j (A.29)
CICFj = crf · CCFj ·∆ACapFj , ∀j (A.30)
DUCFj =
∑
a
∑
l
DCAaj · TPLAal ·OAF
A
ajl, ∀j (A.31)
PrFj = Re
F
j − PUCFj −RMCFj − FOCFj − TRCFj − CICFj −DUCFj , ∀j (A.32)
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ReMk =
∑
i∈Ik
Vik ·ASik, ∀k (A.33)
PUCMk =
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
TPLPijl ·OAF
A
Pijkl, ∀k (A.34)
TRCMk =
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
FTCPijk ·XPijk +
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
V TCPijk ·AFPijk, ∀k (A.35)
DUCMk =
∑
j
∑
g∈Gj
∑
i∈I¯g∩Ik
∑
l
DCPijk · TPLPijl ·OF
A
Pijkl, ∀k (A.36)
LSCMk =
∑
i∈Ik
PCik ·ALSik, ∀k (A.37)
PrMk = Re
M
k − PUCMk − TRCMk −DUCMk − LSCMk , ∀k (A.38)
Given the above constraints, the following lexicographic maixmisation problem is solved at Step
1 of hLexi approach:
Leximax {λ1 −
∑
n
d1n, . . . , λN − 1
N
·
∑
n
dNn}
s.t. λp − dpn ≤ Prn/αn, ∀p = 1, . . . , N, n
λp ∈ R, ∀p = 1, . . . , N
dpn ≥ 0, ∀p = 1, . . . , N, n
Eqs. (A.1)− (A.38) and (56)
(A.39)
Nomenclature
Indices
a AI plant
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g product group
i product
j formulation plant
k market region
l transfer price level
n, n′ supply chain member, including a, j and k
p index used in the dual model
t time period
Sets
G¯i set of the product group that product i belongs to
Gj set of product groups suitable for formulation plant j
I¯g set of products belong to group g
Ik set of products sold in market k
Ki set of markets selling product i
Parameters
ACapAa aggregated capacity of AI plant a
ACapFj aggregated capacity of formulation plant j
ADjk aggregated demand of product i at market k in time period j
CapAa capacity of AI plant a
CapFj capacity of formulation plant j
CCAa unit capital cost for capacity expansion at AI plant a
CCFj unit capital cost for capacity expansion at formulation plant j
crf capital recovery factor
Djkt demand of product i at market k in time period j
DCAaj unit duties of the AI from AI plant a to formulation plant j
DCPijk unit duties of product i from formulation plant j to market k
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FFCPij fixed formulation cost of product i at formulation plant j
FPCAa fixed production cost of AI at AI plant a
FTCAaj fixed transportation cost of AI from AI plant a to formulation plant j
FTCPijk fixed transportation cost of product i from formulation plant j to market k
ICAAa unit inventory cost of the AI at AI plant a
ICAFij unit inventory cost of the AI at formulation plant j
ICPFij unit inventory cost of product i at formulation plant j
ICPMik unit inventory cost of product i at market k
MaxAFAaj maximum aggregated AI flow from AI plant a to formulation plant j
MaxAFFijk maximum aggregated flow of product i from formulation plant j to in k
MaxAPAa maximum aggregated AI production at AI plant a
MaxAPFij maximum aggregated production of product i at formulation plant j
MaxFAaj maximum AI flow from AI plant a to formulation plant j in each time period
MaxFFijk maximum flow of product i from formulation plant j to in k in each time
period
MaxIV AAa maximum inventory of the AI at AI plant a in each time period
MaxIV AFj maximum inventory of the AI at formulation plant j in each time period
MaxIV PFij maximum inventory of product i at formulation plant j in each time period
MaxIV PMik maximum inventory of product i at market k in each time period
MaxPAa maximum AI production at AI plant a in each time period
MaxPFij maximum production of product i at formulation plant j in each time period
MaxPrn maximum profit of supply chain member n
MinAFAaj minimum aggregated AI flow from AI plant a to formulation plant j
MinAFFijk minimum aggregated flow of product i from formulation plant j to in k
MinAPAa minimum aggregated AI production at AI plant a
MinAPFij minimum aggregated production of product i at formulation plant j
MinFAaj minimum AI flow from AI plant a to formulation plant j in each time period
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MinFFijk minimum flow of product i from formulation plant j to in k in each time
period
MinIV AAa minimum inventory of the AI at AI plant a in each time period
MinIV AFj minimum inventory of the AI at formulation plant j in each time period
MinIV PFij minimum inventory of product i at formulation plant j in each time period
MinIV PMik minimum inventory of product i at market k in each time period
MinPAa minimum AI production at AI plant a in each time period
MinPFij minimum production of product i at formulation plant j in each time period
MinPrn minimum profit of supply chain member n
MCAa unit material cost of AI at AI plant a
MCPij unit material cost of product i at formulation plant j
PCik lost sale penalty of product i at market k
TPLAal transfer price level l of AI at AI plant a
TPLPijl transfer price level l of product i at formulation plant j
Vik selling price of product i at market k
V FCPij unit variable formulation cost of product i at formulation plant j
V PCAa unit variable production cost of the AI at AI plant a
V TCAaj unit variable transportation cost of the AI from AI plant a to formulation
plant j
V TCPijk unit variable transportation cost of product i from formulation plant j to
market k
αn bargaining power of supply chain member n
βij unit AI consumption of product i formulation in formulation plant j
δ allowed deviation of the relative profit ratio in hLeix approach
τjk transportation time from formulation plant j to market k
τ¯aj transportation time from AI plant a to formulation plant j
Continuous Variables
AFAaj aggregated flow of AI from AI plant a to formulation plant j
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AFPijk aggregated flow of product i from formulation plant j to market k
ALSik aggregated lost sales of product i at market k
APAa aggregated production of the AI at AI plant a
APPij aggregated production of product i at formulation plant j
ASik aggregated sales of product i at market k in time period t
CICAa capital investment cost of AI plant a
CICFj capital investment cost of formulation plant j
DUCFj duties of AI paid by formulation plant j
DUCMk duties of products paid by market k
FAajt flow of AI sent from AI plant a to formulation plant j in time period t
FPijkt flow of product i sent from formulation plant j to market k in time period t
FOCFj formulation cost of formulation plant j
IV AAat inventory of the AI at AI plant a in time period t
IV AFjt inventory of the AI at formulation plant j in time period t
IV PFijt inventory of product i at formulation plant j in time period t
IV PMikt inventory of product i at market k in time period t
IV CAa inventory cost of AI plant a
IV CFj inventory cost of formulation plant j
IV CMk inventory cost of market k
LSikt lost sales of product i at market k in time period t
LSCMk lost sales cost of products at market k
OAF
A
ajl auxiliary variable, ≡ OAal ·AFAaj
OAF
P
ijkl auxiliary variable, ≡ OPijl ·AFPijk
OF
A
ajlt auxiliary variable, ≡ OAal · FAajt
OF
P
ijklt auxiliary variable, ≡ OPijl · FPijkt
PAat production of the AI at AI plant a in time period t
PPijt production of product i at formulation plant j in time period t
PCAa production cost of AI plant a
50
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Prn profit of supply chain member n
PrAa profit of AI plant a
PrFj profit of formulation plant j
PrMk profit of market k
ReAa revenue of AI plant a
ReFj revenue of formulation plant j
ReMk revenue of market k
RMCAa raw materials cost of AI plant a
RMCFj raw materials cost of formulation plant j
Sikt sales of product i at market k in time period t
TPAa transfer price of the AI from AI plant a
TPPij transfer price of product i from formulation plant j
TPCFj transfer payment cost of formulation plant j
TPCMk transfer payment cost of market k
TRCFj transportation cost paid by formulation plant j
TRCMk transportation cost paid by market k
TotalPr total profit of the supply chain
∆ACapAa aggregated capacity increment of AI plant a
∆ACapFj aggregated capacity increment of formulation plant j
∆CapAa capacity increment of AI plant a
∆CapFj capacity increment of formulation plant j
λp, dpn variables in the dual model
Binary Variables
EAa 1 if the AI is produced at AI plant a; 0 otherwise
EPij 1 if product i is produced at formulation plant j; 0 otherwise
OAal 1 if transfer price level l is selected for the AI formulated at AI plant a; 0
otherwise
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OPijl 1 if transfer price level l is selected for product i formulated at formulation
plant j; 0 otherwise
WAat 1 if the AI is produced at AI plant a in time period t; 0 otherwise
WPijt 1 if product i is produced at formulation plant j in time period t; 0 otherwise
XAaj 1 if the AI is shipped from AI plant a to formulation plant j; 0 otherwise
XPijk 1 if product i is shipped from formulation plant j to market k; 0 otherwise
Y Aajt 1 if the AI is shipped from AI plant a to formulation plant j in time period
t; 0 otherwise
Y Pijkt 1 if product i is shipped from formulation plant j to market k in time period
t; 0 otherwise
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